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TITLE: The Jews who weren’t there: cinema, anti-Semitism and Hungarian national identity 1938-48​[1]​

Abstract:
In early 20th century Hungary a history of relatively peaceful coexistence was overwritten in public discourse as irreconcilable difference. ‘The Jews’ were labelled a homogeneous community with shared goals and ambitions. ‘They’ were said to be opposed to the nation. Drawing on centuries of national self-identification as defenders of Christianity from eastern invaders, ‘Hungarian’ was determined in opposition to the invading ‘Jew’.
As the debate of what makes a Hungarian raged in the press, literature and in the political arena, Hungarian cinema neither recognized the history of peaceful coexistence of Jewish and Christian groups, nor did it belabour the narrative of irreconcilable opposition. Rather, Hungarian cinema, recognized as a key asset in the dissemination of state-approved ideology, omitted ‘the Jews’ from the social makeup of the nation altogether.
The paper considers Hungarian filmic representations of the nation during the war and its aftermath. It compares two films: Europe Does Not Answer (Radványi, 1941) and Somewhere in Europe (Radványi, 1947). Both films address issues of vital importance of their time, and both omit ‘the Jews’ from narratives spun from real scenarios. One imagines the effect of the outbreak of war on the broad ‘European family’, the other tells the story of children orphaned by war. In both, the war, from the outbreak to its aftermath, becomes a Hungarian experience in which ‘the Jews’ play no part.
The analysis of the two films will interrogate the omission of ‘the Jews’ from films that purportedly articulate historical truths about Hungary’s position in the international order.

Biographical note: Gábor Gergely is a Leverhulme Early Career Fellow at the University of Manchester. His research project investigates anti-Semitism and articulations of national identity in Hungarian sound film between 1931 and 1944. He has published previously on Central European émigré actors in Hollywood (Foreign Devils, 2012). More recently he has published on post-war Hungarian film in Studies in Eastern European Cinema.


Randolph Braham describes the late 19th century as a ‘Golden Era’ for Jewish Hungarians, a period in which, ‘as a consequence of the Hungarian policy of tolerance, [they] considered themselves an integral part of the Hungarian nation’ (2000, 20). This ‘Golden Era’ in which Jewish Hungarians felt sufficiently confident in their integration into the nation to think of themselves as fully Hungarian, and even demonstrate ‘fervent patriotism’ (ibid.), gave way to a period in which first they were discursively separated from the nation, then removed from the body of the nation by the power of law backed by violent force. This paper looks at two films that reflect the discursive aspect of the elimination of Jewish Hungarians from the nation.
The two films were directed by Géza Radványi. The first film was made during the war, in 1941. The second, after the war, in 1947. Both were financed by organizations with clear political aims: the state-subsidized wartime film industry, and the Hungarian Communist Party’s film production firm, respectively. Both films reflect on the geopolitical situation that was their context, and both films tell the story of a disparate group of people displaced by war. This paper argues that in addition to these significant points in common, the two films share an absence, too. Both films omit Jewish Hungarians from the history of the war. I contend that the omission serves a similar purpose in both cases: in the first instance it articulates an ethnically homogeneous national identity by denying the existence of those who complicate the ‘us’ in the simple binary opposition between us and them, and in the second instance, it asserts an uncomplicated Hungarian identity and in the process writes Jewish Hungarians out of their own history so as to construct a narrative of victimhood for the Hungarian nation as a whole.
This omission was in stark contrast with the reality of Jewish Hungarians living alongside, among, and with Hungarians of other religious, ethnic or cultural backgrounds as neighbours, friends and family up to the Holocaust, and once more after the defeat of the Nazis. This paper shows this omission at work, and explains its significance and rationale. I use Hayward’s national cinema theory, informed by feminist criticism, to argue that Hungarian cinema framed Jewishness as a ‘structuring absence’ around which the normative majority identity is defined (Kuhn 1982 via Hayward 2013, 214).
Europe Doesn’t Answer (Géza Radványi) premiered in March, 1941 in Budapest’s German-owned cinema palace: Uránia. It was reviewed in the Hungarian Film Chamber’s trade weekly (Magyar Film 1941/12.)​[2]​ by Magyar Film chief Dezső Váczi, whose editorials can be read as announcements of official state policy. Váczi commends the film’s authenticity, its news reportage style and its innovative genre, which he calls perfect, as well as ‘the plasticity of the characters, the many fascinating little stories, [and] the lifelike setting’. The effusive praise for the film and its director is evidence of strong state approval for Radványi. Indeed, he would be given the helm on Hungary’s first colour feature, later that year.
	The plot is this: Maria Holm (played by the director’s wife Mária Tasnády-Fekete) is a retired spy, now a fashion designer, compelled to undertake one final mission to carry secret documents from America to Europe. Film Chamber boss Ferenc Kiss is the ship’s captain who orders a radio blackout when war breaks out in order to prevent conflict among the passengers. So it is not so much that Europe Doesn’t Answer, but that The Ocean-liner Doesn’t Listen. This back-to-front perspective points to a peculiar geopolitical outlook, in which the isolation of the population from international news allows the maintenance of order. Holm mistrusts all around her, but cannot help falling in love with the dashing violinist Vincent Gordon (Petrovich). After much intrigue and some violence, which sees a fake Count arrested for stealing a radio on behalf of the millionaire van Gulden (played by Somlay, star of Somewhere in Europe), the ship reaches port in Vigo in neutral(ish) Spain. Holm disembarks and hurries to her rendezvous with her fellow-operative. It turns out to be Gordon. The two kiss and resolve to face the future together.
The film is an exploration of a variety of private responses to the outbreak of war. Characters from a range of backgrounds respond first to the uncertainty of the future, and then to the knowledge of the beginning of war. It is possible to read the community of passengers on board both as a multinational European community, and as a broad cross section of Hungarian society. In either case, the passengers figure as recognizable ‘types’ that make up the imagined community. In this paper I focus on the second reading of this community as a sample of an imagined Hungarian nation.​[3]​ Bearing in mind the state’s minute involvement in the film industry, from the vetting of scripts to ultimate control over the professional bodies of the industry, we can think of the community imagined by this film, and the political options open to that community as state-approved imaginings of Hungary’s position within the global balance of power.​[4]​
Although ostensibly Europe Doesn’t Answer deals with the very real situation of the outbreak of war at the end of summer 1939, it reimagines the community that received news of the end of peace in Europe as excluding Jewish Hungarians, a segment of society with reason to learn of Hitler’s war with deep concern. In this officially approved cinematic imagining of Hungary there are no Jewish characters, or to be more precise there are none that are explicitly identified as being of Jewish faith or origin. This absence is crucial, and I now go on to explain how the ‘Jews who weren’t there’ were put to work in Hungary’s cinematic nation building project.
Europe Doesn’t Answer was made and released amid a highly charged public debate over the place of citizens of Jewish faith within the Hungarian nation. Although the question about Jewish presence and influence in the country was still being asked, the debate was largely settled by 1941: three anti-Jewish acts of Parliament had been passed (1938; 1939; 1941). The latest, Act 15 of 1941, had forbidden sexual relations between Christians and those who were Jews under the law. The expropriation of Jewish Hungarians was by now well under way, with Jewish participation in the economic life of the nation severely restricted. Thus while public discourse was obsessively concerned with Jewishness, and the impossibility of ‘Jews’ to be Hungarian in terms of race, sentiment, and citizenship, the film remains silent on this issue, as if the debate, and Jewish Hungarians no longer, or had never existed.
This denial of the existence of Jewish Hungarians came in spite of the insistence of anti-Semitic commentators that the Jews constituted a huge burden and were intricately threaded into all aspects of Hungarian national life in order to undermine it. Thus while popular discourse beyond the cinema was obsessively preoccupied with the question of Jewish presence, Hungarian cinema painted an image of the nation in which the Jews played no part, and occupied no space. There is an unusual and rare remark in a 1933 film that reflects this contradictory aspect of Hungarian public and filmic discourse. In The Old Scoundrel, a dual-version German-Hungarian film shot in Hungary by a German crew, the desperately indebted Hungarian nobleman asks his estate manager to raise money from local Jews. The estate manager replies: there are none who will lend you any money. In reply the aristocrat quips: ‘so there aren’t enough of them, after all.’ This chilling joke about an excess of Jews is rare for Hungarian cinema, but not unusual for the more overt anti-Semitism of German popular cultural discourses. It can be said to point to a disconnect between the cinematic discourse that downplays or outright denies Jewish presence, and a public discourse completely fixated on Jewish presence in the nation.
This filmic denial of Jewish presence can be theorized using the concept of Annette Kuhn’s ‘structuring absence’ (1982, 87) as applied by Hayward to national cinema studies (2013, 214). For Hayward presence (e.g. on screen) and absence (represented but not corporeally present) are two key concepts of cinema. By virtue of its projection onto a flat surface of images that have their referent in the real world, film itself works as a paradoxical duality of absence and presence. Unless we speak of digital cinema, when things get more complicated. In pre-digital cinema things are both present and absent: represented, without being present. In matters of filmic representation gaps, therefore, can be crucial. As Hayward suggests: ‘what gets left out draws attention to itself by its absence’ (2013, 214).
Films that build the nation by asserting a national identity conceived in opposition to those who do not belong make use of this paradoxical duality (Hayward, 2013). That is they highlight the importance of that which they suppress in the very act of suppressing it. They assert the oneness of the nation by denying the difference that is visible to those who observe the nation in ‘reality’. Figurations of the nation as fiction, for instance in the cinema, serve to create an imagined national community that then becomes more real than the visible nation. Thus films that show the nation, in the Hungarian context as a single-race nation-state of Catholic ethnic Hungarians, serve to articulate and thus make (seemingly) real that homogenous nation of Catholic Hungarians. This image of an ideal nation masquerading as the image of the true nation is then used to mobilize the patriotic sentiments necessary for violent action to ‘defend’ and thereby create this homogenous nation. This can take place via the forcible removal of those who do not fit the image of the nation created through the filmic imaginary.​[5]​
Europe Doesn’t Answer makes use of the discursive elimination of Jewish Hungarians from the body of the nation in order to create a coherent imagined national community. As I argued earlier, the film offers us a masquerade of the microcosm of Hungarian society. This is a masquerade that serves to hide from view the true face of Hungary, all the while offering up to viewers legibly coded types that putatively make up the nation. Thus we have the honourable spies, the tragic spymaster and the ship’s captain and crew, who are all prepared to risk all for the greater good. They stand for Hungary’s military and the ordinary men and women working to bring peace and prosperity to the nation. We have the ailing peasant, desperate to return to the homeland which he had left for America in vain hopes of a better life abroad, and the washed-up Hollywood star who realizes she must reconnect with her roots in the Hungarian countryside. They stand for those who were misled by false promises and tempted by vain ambition, and whose life’s labour benefited a foreign nation. We have the bickering couple of university lecturers, whose witty repartee and intellectual curiosity offers comic relief as well as an example to follow. They stand for the educated, middle classes. We have the millionaire investor who is taught the lesson that the misfortune of others is not a business opportunity. He stands for the moneyed class who must learn to contribute to the national war effort. And we have the happy-go-lucky jazz band whose members understand that they must lay down their instruments, and if necessary their lives in the coming war. But the film erases from its imagined real-life community of ship passengers those members of Hungarian society that were the subject of the never-ending and increasingly radical public debate known as ‘the Jewish question’. In doing so it creates an image of the nation as anti-Semitic ideologues hoped it would become: without Jewish Hungarians in the picture.
Remarkably, this discourse where Jewishness operates as an absence that structures Hungarian national identity persists beyond the war and can be found at work in Radványi’s most celebrated film: Somewhere in Europe.
The film, made in 1947, was bankrolled by the Hungarian Communist Party’s filmmaking arm. Géza Radványi once more took a writing and directing credit. The Communist Hungarian film theorist Béla Balázs has a co-writing credit. He is usually regarded as the chief creative influence on the film, which is generally seen as one of Hungarian cinema’s greatest achievements. It is also considered an artistic formulation of a point of consensus for a post-war Hungary facing the difficult task of reconstruction. The film articulates the need for a post-war new beginning by focusing on a group of children orphaned by war as they find refuge in a ruined castle. There they strike an uneasy alliance with the castle’s resident hermit, the world famous conductor called, I suspect significantly, Péter Simon. This rock – the man and the castle - upon which the post-war edifice of Hungarian Communism would be built already points to the constancy of Hungarian national self-identification, which was steeped in religious imagery and narratives of martyrdom.
The other crucial constancy that can be apprehended in this post-war text about Hungarian national identity is the writing out of Jewish Hungarians from the recent past.
That is not to say that Somewhere in Europe pretends the Holocaust did not happen. What makes the film so remarkable is that it does situate its characters in a post-Holocaust world, but it re-imagines the Holocaust as happening to Hungarians not marked as Jews. So rather than outright deny stories and histories of Jewish suffering, Somewhere in Europe reimagines these as Hungarian narratives of suffering. So the child squeezed through the window of a cattle wagon is marked with signs of middle class-ness (wire-frame glasses and a sailor costume worn by secondary school children), but is not marked with stereotypical or Nazi-imposed indicators of Jewishness. Similarly, the girl whose father is machine-gunned in the film’s opening montage of wartime trauma, is inscribed with a signifier of working-classness (he wears a flat cap), but he is not inscribed with Jewishness. And finally, in the film’s emotive flashback of a young woman’s experience of being conned into having sex with a German officer overseeing the deportation of families from her building, the deportees are marked with signs of deporteeness, but once more, signs of Jewishness, such as stars of David on overcoats, are absent.
The point here is the elimination of unequivocal markers of Jewishness. Despite the defeat of the Axis, anti-Semitic stereotypes had not been eliminated from the Hungarian public imaginary. The child who escapes from the train to Auschwitz is a feeble child with bad eyesight. He cannot swim and takes no part in the more strenuous tasks undertaken by the community of orphans that he joins. The markers in question, the star of David and the traditional dress of rural Jewish communities that in real life tended to be less assimilated than Budapest’s predominantly Neolog and non-observant Jewish communities, are essential to the story of the process of the separation of Jewish Hungarians from the rest of society. The point is that their representation would render these experiences unequivocally Jewish. In other words the story of suffering, in the anti-Semitic concept of a Hungarian national identity that excludes the ‘Jews’, would now exclude the Hungarians. Thus by removing the Nazi-imposed markers of Jewishness, the film makes possible the insertion of Hungarians into what was, until then, an exclusively Jewish story.
This reimagining of the recent past is further demonstrated by the relegation of the three characters identified as victims of Nazi persecution to bit parts. The film is not really interested in their stories. The film is concerned with the story of the broad community of children, among whom it sees no difference, except when the implied Jewishness of one of the three means that he is excluded from a community experience. In other words Jewishness only enters into the picture, when it serves to exclude the Jew from the community. In the scene in which the film’s orphan heroes bury one of their own after an assault on their castle by nearby villagers, the child with the spectacles is discursively separated from the rest. As the children surround their dead comrade’s grave, their leader invites those who can pray to lead the others in prayer. The child with the spectacles, the only character more than cursorily, but still only circumstantially identified as Jewish, stands apart. He does not, because he cannot, participate in this performance of ideological-national-spiritual community. As we have seen, by contrast the majority easily adjusts the markers of minority identity so that itself may be accommodated within that label. So this is not a representation that does not see difference. This is a representation that writes difference out of the community it imagines, so as to appropriate stories of Jewish suffering for use by the nation, in order to re-articulate the victimhood model of Hungarian national identity. Thus the Mongol invasion of the 13th century, the Turkish conquest of the 16th century, the three centuries of Habsburg rule, and the Treaty of Trianon are joined by the Nazi occupation, reinvented as a specifically Hungarian national trauma. It becomes one of a series of penances, which, according to the Hungarian national anthem, has left the nation in credit with regard to as-yet uncommitted sins: megbűnhődte már e nép a múltat s jövendőt.
I conclude with an example for this process of discursive elimination of Jewishness in a self-serving narrative of victimhood in contemporary Hungary. A recent public monument, paid for by the Hungarian Government and erected on Szabadság tér, or Freedom Square, attests to this narrative of national victimhood: Hungary, symbolized by the Archangel Gabriel, herald of the Immaculate Conception, is set upon by the German Imperial Eagle. Angelic, innocent, Christian Hungary is preyed upon by Nazi Germany. The statue, dedicated to the victims of the Nazi Occupation of Hungary, features no reference to Jews or Jewishness. Their place has been usurped by a self-whitewashing Hungarian nation preening as innocent, blameless victims.
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^1	  This paper was written as part of a research project funded by the Leverhulme Trust under its Early Career Fellowship scheme.
^2	  This film is like a whole-page colourful news report from the pen of the best correspondent. And indeed, we have been told that the film is based on a news report, which was published at the end of August 1939 in one of the Budapest papers. The film was written and directed by Géza Radváyni, who gives us a new experiment, when he chooses not to tell a proper story, but to sketch character types and episodes. This new Hungarian film genre is, in its own way, perfect. It tells the story of a few days in the lives of the most diverse types (also races GG) of passengers on an ocean liner before it sails into port somewhere in Europe. Radványi avoids the well-trodden path, does not work to an established recipe, on the contrary, he takes risks for the sake of innovation. Once more he has gambled and won. It is certain that his pioneering work will beget followers. The picture is star-studded. Mária Tasnády Fekete is beautiful. Svetislav Petrovich is debonair. Ferenc Kiss is forceful. Ferenc Táray is mysteriously interesting. Ilona Titkos is honest. Artúr Somlay is imposing. Zoltán Greguss is a proper bandit in a dinner suit. Kálmán Rózsahegyi captures the flavour of the countryside. Gerő Mály and Piri Vaszary are amusing. Emmi Buttykay is sweet. Béla Mihályfi is human. vitéz Lajos Hajmássy, Lajos Köpeczi Boócz and Miklós Gábor are great in small roles. Szabolcs Fényes’s score is the most polished film music. János Horváth’s sets, especially the ship complex, are lifelike and full of depth. Rezső Icsey’s photography carry the scent of the abroad. V. D.
^3	  In any article that may evolve from this paper, I would give equal weight to the rival interpretation.
^4	  We see the ship’s jazz band splinter into its constituent nationalities, but vow to reassemble a month after the declaration of peace in St Mark’s Square, in Venice. The glib certainty of the possibility of a post-war resumption of pre-war lives, the belief that no-one would die, that careers could be seamlessly resumed, that the European political landscape will not be irrevocably redrawn, points out the naïveté of popular Hungarian expectations of the outcomes of the war. We see the Hungarian peasant yearning for a return to the homeland after his American dream turned sour. We see the parallel story of the washed-up Hollywood star decide to reconnect with her roots in the Hungarian countryside. We see men and women undertaking the dangerous work of espionage to serve their homelands. We also see the American millionaire chastised by the ship’s captain, whose name, and thus nationality is left unspecified. This suggests the intriguing possibility that he is Hungarian, or possibly a representative of a higher moral order. This latter positions him as a supranational font of power. Played by the man most closely associated with strident political activism and radical Hungarian nationalism, the character retains a strong Hungarian flavour, even when read as a supranational source of authority with solemn responsibility towards all his passengers (i.e. all of humanity). This tells us something fascinating about Hungarian ideas about the position of Hungary within the political hierarchy of Europe. It shows that in the popular discourse of mass entertainment, via state-approved narratives about Hungary’s political situation, Hungarians saw themselves as being possessed of the moral authority to be arbiters of international conflict, as being legitimate repositories of supranational power, and as being motivated by a belief in and strict commitment to the greater common good for which they are willing to make sacrifices and demand the same of others.
^5	  The concept of the constitutive outside can be productively applied to 1930s and early 1940s Hungarian cinema, and its representation of Hungarians of Jewish faith. Anti-Semitism had emerged as a cohesive force in the newly ethnically homogenous post-Trianon Hungary. The argument for the exclusion of Jewish Hungarians from the economic and cultural life of the nation worked to create national cohesion, while also picking away at the fabric of the national community by excluding a group that had been until then considered an integral part of the nation building project (Braham 2000, 20). In identifying a subset of its population as a homogenous group against whom a national identity could be asserted, Hungary created a potent figure of the enemy within to create national unity. The strategy chosen carried in itself the germ of the destruction of the desired outcome. It singled out a target group whose expropriation could boost the coffers of the state and its backers, but also undermined hitherto consensual concepts of citizenship and a national identity based in religious tolerance and cultural inclusivity (Pelle 2004).Having been attributed the blame for Hungary’s post-Trianon troubles Jewish Hungarians became, in the 1930s, the constitutive outside to the Hungarian national ideal as formulated through popular media discourses, and especially the cinema. Hungarianness was defined in opposition to traits that were labelled Jewish in anti-Semitic stereotypes. So in popular cultural formulations of the national character Hungarians became generous to the point of profligacy in contrast with the stereotype of money-grabbing and uncharitable Jews. They were said to have verve and a fiery temperament, but also respect for solemnity, as opposed to the calculating, sly and glib character of the Jews. Hungarians were typified by their devotion to Church, nation and family, as opposed to irreligious, treasonous and philandering Jews. It was primarily the films of the Jewish Hungarian Gyula Kabos, more often than not working with a Jewish Hungarian director, that provided the stereotypical representations of Hungarian Jews. This unhappy irony can be explained by the fact that the filmmakers were catering to an increasingly radicalized audience among whom anti-Semitism was rife, and the fact that many Jewish Hungarians had internalized anti-Semitic stereotypes. (Examples abound, from the radical Jewish Hungarian thinker Oszkár Jászi who drew parallels between the mentality of the Bolshevik and the innate racial characteristics of the Jews (Gyurgyák 2007, 192), to Anna Lesznai, who argued that Jews should be re-educated to overcome their innate neuroses and thus render them fit for participation in Hungarian society (ibid., 194-5). Neither views can be said to be extreme in the context of the time, and both illustrate the extent to which anti-Semitic stereotypes had come to be accepted as axiomatic across the political spectrum of early 20th century Hungary.
